Working Paper: NBER ID: w13665
Authors: Christopher A. Parsons; Johan Sulaeman; Michael C. Yates; Daniel S. Hamermesh
Abstract: We explore umpires' racial/ethnic preferences in the evaluation of Major League Baseball pitchers. Controlling for umpire, pitcher, batter and catcher fixed effects and many other factors, strikes are more likely to be called if the umpire and pitcher match race/ethnicity. This effect only exists where there is little scrutiny of umpires' behavior -- in ballparks without computerized systems monitoring umpires' calls, at poorly attended games, and when the called pitch cannot determine the outcome of the at-bat. If a pitcher shares the home-plate umpire's race/ethnicity, he gives up fewer runs per game and improves his team's chance of winning. The results suggest that standard measures of salary discrimination that adjust for measured productivity may generally be flawed. We derive the magnitude of the bias generally and apply it to several examples.
Keywords: racial discrimination; umpires; major league baseball; performance evaluation
JEL Codes: J44; J71
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| racial/ethnic match between umpires and pitchers (J15) | likelihood of a pitch being called a strike (J52) |
| low scrutiny contexts (D80) | likelihood of a pitch being called a strike (J52) |
| racial/ethnic match between umpires and pitchers (J15) | significant differences in game outcomes (C72) |
| racial/ethnic match between umpires and pitchers (J15) | pitchers who share the umpire's race/ethnicity tend to give up fewer runs (J15) |
| low scrutiny contexts (D80) | umpires express racial/ethnic preferences more freely (J15) |
| bias in performance evaluations (J71) | underestimation of wage discrimination (J79) |