Working Paper: NBER ID: w13637
Authors: Brian Knight; Nathan Schiff
Abstract: This paper provides an investigation of the role of momentum and social learning in sequential voting systems. In the econometric model, voters are uncertain over candidate quality, and voters in late states attempt to infer the information held by those in early states from voting returns. Candidates experience momentum effects when their performance in early states exceeds expectations. The empirical application focuses on the responses of daily polling data to the release of voting returns in the 2004 presidential primary. We find that Kerry benefited from surprising wins in early states and took votes away from Dean, who held a strong lead prior to the beginning of the primary season. The voting weights implied by the estimated model demonstrate that early voters have up to 20 times the influence of late voters in the selection of candidates, demonstrating a significant departure from the ideal of "one person, one vote." We then address several alternative, non-learning explanations for our results. Finally, we run simulations under different electoral structures and find that a simultaneous election would have been more competitive due to the absence of herding and that alternative sequential structures would have yielded different outcomes.
Keywords: momentum; social learning; presidential primaries
JEL Codes: D7; D8
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| early state performance (D29) | later voter support (K16) |
| early state performance (D29) | voters' expectations (D72) |
| voters' expectations (D72) | later voter support (K16) |
| candidates' perceived quality (D79) | later voter support (K16) |
| underperforming candidates (D79) | reverse momentum effects (C69) |
| early voters (K16) | influence on late voters (D72) |