Working Paper: NBER ID: w13608
Authors: Rafael La Porta; Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes; Andrei Shleifer
Abstract: In the last decade, economists have produced a considerable body of research suggesting that the historical origin of a country's laws is highly correlated with a broad range of its legal rules and regulations, as well as with economic outcomes. We summarize this evidence and attempt a unified interpretation. We also address several objections to the empirical claim that legal origins matter. Finally, we assess the implications of this research for economic reform.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: K00; N20; P51
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| legal origins (K15) | legal protection for outside investors (F23) |
| legal origins (K15) | financial development metrics (O16) |
| common law systems (K15) | legal protection for outside investors (F23) |
| common law systems (K15) | stock market capitalization (G10) |
| legal origins (K15) | regulatory frameworks (G38) |
| civil law countries (K15) | government regulation and ownership (L51) |
| government regulation (L51) | corruption (D73) |
| government regulation (L51) | unemployment (J64) |
| legal origins (K15) | judicial independence (K40) |
| judicial independence (K40) | efficiency in contract enforcement (D86) |
| legal origins (K15) | property rights security (P14) |
| legal origins (K15) | economic performance (P17) |