Working Paper: NBER ID: w13562
Authors: Aaron Edlin; Andrew Gelman; Noah Kaplan
Abstract: For voters with "social" preferences, the expected utility of voting is approximately independent of the size of the electorate, suggesting that rational voter turnouts can be substantial even in large elections. Less important elections are predicted to have lower turnout, but a feedback mechanism keeps turnout at a reasonable level under a wide range of conditions. The main contributions of this paper are: (1) to show how, for an individual with both selfish and social preferences, the social preferences will dominate and make it rational for a typical person to vote even in large elections;(2) to show that rational socially-motivated voting has a feedback mechanism that stabilizes turnout at reasonable levels (e.g., 50% of the electorate); (3) to link the rational social-utility model of voter turnout with survey findings on socially-motivated vote choice.
Keywords: elections; turnout; sociotropic voting; rational choice
JEL Codes: H0; K21
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| social preferences (D71) | increased voter turnout (K16) |
| lower turnout (K16) | higher perceived utility from voting (D72) |
| social motivations (D91) | vote choice (D72) |