Working Paper: NBER ID: w13485
Authors: Jeffrey Grogger; Lynn Karoly
Abstract: Transfer payments to poor families are increasingly conditioned on work, either via wage subsidies available only to workers or via work requirements in more traditional welfare programs. Although the effects of such programs on employment are fairly well understood, relatively little is known about their effects on marriage or child well-being. We review a small number of studies that provide such information here. Our discussion of marriage is couched in terms of a theoretical model that draws from the efficient-household literature. The model is consistent with the wide range of effects that we observe and suggests an explanation for some of the observed differences. The theoretical framework in which we couch our review of results on children is likewise consistent with the observed variation between programs and among children of different ages.
Keywords: work-conditioned transfers; marriage; child well-being; welfare programs
JEL Codes: I30
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| work-conditioned transfers (F16) | marital surplus (J12) |
| marital surplus (J12) | marriage (J12) |
| work-conditioned transfers (F16) | single parents' options (J12) |
| work-conditioned transfers (F16) | marriage (J12) |
| MFIP (F20) | marriage (J12) |
| MFIP (F20) | separations (Y40) |
| separations (Y40) | divorce rates (J12) |
| SSP (H55) | marriage (J12) |