Working Paper: NBER ID: w13380
Authors: Ilyana Kuziemko
Abstract: In order to lengthen prison terms, many U.S. states have limited parole boards' traditional authority to grant early releases. I develop a framework in which the welfare effects of this reform depend on (1) the elasticity of future recidivism with respect to time in prison, (2) the accuracy of boards in conditioning release dates on recidivism risk, and (3) the extent to which such conditioning encourages inmates to reform. Using micro-data from Georgia and quasi-experimental variation arising from policy shocks and institutional features of its criminal justice system, I find that longer prison terms decrease recidivism, boards assign higher-risk inmates to longer terms, and inmates' investment in rehabilitative activities falls -- and their recidivism rises -- when boards' discretion is limited. Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that the benefits of parole (the ability to ration prison resources based on recidivism risk and the creation of incentives) outweigh the costs (lost incapacitation due to shorter prison terms).
Keywords: parole; recidivism; criminal justice; rehabilitation
JEL Codes: H0; H43; H75
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| limited parole board discretion (K40) | decrease investments in rehabilitative activities (H54) |
| decrease investments in rehabilitative activities (H54) | increase recidivism (K14) |
| parole board discretion (K40) | rehabilitation efforts (Q26) |
| longer prison terms (K40) | decrease recidivism (K14) |
| time served (K40) | recidivism (K14) |