Working Paper: NBER ID: w13354
Authors: Andrew B. Abel
Abstract: In an economy with identical infinitely-lived households that obtain utility from leisure as well as consumption, Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) have shown that the optimal tax system to pay for an exogenous stream of government purchases involves a zero tax rate on capital in the long run, with tax revenue collected by a distortionary tax on labor income. Extending the results of Hall and Jorgenson (1971) to general equilibrium, I show that if purchasers of capital are permitted to deduct capital expenditures from taxable capital income, then a constant tax rate on capital income is non-distortionary. Importantly, even though this specification of the capital income tax imposes a zero effective tax rate on capital, the capital income tax can collect substantial revenue. Provided that government purchases do not exceed gross capital income less gross investment, the optimal tax system will consist of a positive tax rate on capital income and a zero tax rate on labor income--just the opposite of the results of Chamley and Judd.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: E62; H21
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| capital income tax system with immediate expensing (H20) | neutrality in capital accumulation decisions (G31) |
| neutral capital income tax (H24) | substantial revenue collection (H27) |
| government spending does not exceed gross capital income minus gross investment (P44) | neutral capital income tax can generate substantial revenue (H29) |
| positive capital income tax rate with immediate expensing (G31) | nondistortionary tax system (H21) |
| nondistortionary tax system (H21) | enhances utility for households (D11) |