Working Paper: NBER ID: w13321
Authors: Pablo T. Spiller; Rafael Gely
Abstract: This survey paper starts from the basic, and intuitive, assumption that judges are human and as such, can be modeled in the same fashion we model politicians, activists, managers: driven by well-defined preferences, behaving in a purposive and forward-looking fashion. We explore, then, the role politics play in judicial decision-making. We provide a brief overview of what is called the "strategic approach," compare it to alternative approaches to understand judicial behavior, and offer some concluding thoughts about the future of positive analyses of judicial decision-making.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: K0; K4
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| political context (P26) | judicial behavior (K40) |
| congressional preferences (D72) | judicial decisions (K41) |
| judicial preferences (K40) | political constraints (D72) |
| judicial decisions (K41) | legislative expectations (D72) |