Working Paper: NBER ID: w13142
Authors: Robert A. Pollak
Abstract: In "Unpacking the Household: Informal Property Rights Around the Hearth" (Yale Law Journal, 2006) Robert Ellickson argues that as long as members of a household expect their relationship to continue, norms, rather than law, will determine allocations among them. More specifically, Ellickson argues that in "midgame" household members either ignore the "endgame" completely or, if they do take endgame considerations into account, the relevant endgame considerations are determined by norms rather than by law. This paper examines the fit between Ellickson's claims and four bargaining models that economists have used to understand interactions within household and families.
Keywords: household economics; bargaining models; norms; legal rules; resource allocation
JEL Codes: D1; J12; K36
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| norms (D63) | resource allocation (H61) |
| legal rules (K40) | resource allocation (H61) |
| expectation of ongoing relationships (L14) | reliance on informal norms (Z13) |
| control over resources (Q34) | allocation within households (D13) |
| bargaining power (C79) | allocation within households (D13) |