Working Paper: NBER ID: w13098
Authors: Hilary Sigman
Abstract: This paper explores the empirical effects of decentralization on environmental quality by studying water pollution in rivers around the world. It examines the level of pollution and variation in pollution across jurisdictions within a country, for both a local and a regional pollutant. Federal countries exhibit greater interjurisdictional variation in pollution, supporting the traditional view that decentralization allows policies more tailored to local conditions. However, the analysis does not point to a "race to the bottom" in pollution levels.
Keywords: Decentralization; Environmental Quality; Water Pollution
JEL Codes: H77; Q5
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Decentralization (H77) | Tailored environmental policies (Q58) |
| Decentralization (H77) | No increase in local pollutants (Q53) |
| Higher decentralization (H77) | No evidence of race to the bottom in pollution levels (F64) |
| Decentralization (H77) | Enhanced policy responsiveness (D78) |
| Decentralization (H77) | Higher interjurisdictional variation in pollution levels (H73) |
| Decentralization (H77) | Increased levels of regional pollutants (R11) |