Working Paper: NBER ID: w13026
Authors: Daniel S. Hamermesh
Abstract: This examination of the role and potential for replication in economics points out the paucity of both pure replication -- checking on others' published papers using their data -- and scientific replication -- using data representing different populations in one's own work or in a Comment. Several controversies in empirical economics illustrate how and how not to behave when replicating others' work. The incentives for replication facing editors, authors and potential replicators are examined. Recognising these incentives, I advance proposals aimed at journal editors that will increase the supply of replication studies, and I propose a way of generating more scientific replication that will make empirical economic research more credible.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: A14; B41; C59
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| lack of replication (C59) | credibility of empirical research (C90) |
| insufficient incentives for authors (A19) | low demand for data requests (R22) |
| technological advancements in data sharing (O36) | increase in replication studies (C59) |
| fear of replication (C59) | engaging in dishonest practices (K42) |