Working Paper: NBER ID: w13008
Authors: Nicola Persico; Jos Carlos RodrÃguez-Pueblita; Dan Silverman
Abstract: This paper presents a new model of political competition where candidates belong to factions. Before elections, factions compete to direct local public goods to their local constituencies. The model of factional competition delivers a rich set of implications relating the internal organization of the party to the allocation of resources. Several key theoretical predictions of the model find a counterpart in our empirical analysis of newly coded data on the provision of water services in Mexico.
Keywords: Political Competition; Factions; Public Goods
JEL Codes: D72; D73; H4; H54
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Faction presence (F55) | Allocation of public resources (H49) |
| Faction persistence (P31) | Policy inefficiency (D61) |