Working Paper: NBER ID: w12994
Authors: Orazio Attanasio; Nicola Pavoni
Abstract: We derive testable implications of model in which first best allocations are not achieved because of a moral hazard problem with hidden saving. We show that in this environment agents typically achieve more insurance than that obtained under autarchy via saving, and that consumption allocation gives rise to 'excess smoothness of consumption', as found and defined by Campbell and Deaton (1987). We argue that the evidence on excess smoothness is consistent with a violation of the simple intertemporal budget constraint considered in a Bewley economy (with a single asset) and use techniques proposed by Hansen et al. (1991) to test the intertemporal budget constraint. We also construct closed form examples where the excess smoothness parameter has a structural interpretation in terms of the severity of the moral hazard problem. Evidence from the UK on the dynamic properties of consumption and income in micro data is consistent with the implications of the model.
Keywords: Risk Sharing; Moral Hazard; Consumption; Permanent Income Hypothesis
JEL Codes: D82; E21
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| moral hazard and hidden savings (G52) | additional insurance (G52) |
| additional insurance (G52) | excess smoothness of consumption (D15) |
| moral hazard and hidden savings (G52) | smoother consumption patterns (D15) |
| excess smoothness of consumption (D15) | violations of the intertemporal budget constraint (D10) |
| moral hazard severity (G52) | degree of excess smoothness (C51) |
| degree of risk sharing (D81) | severity of moral hazard problem (D82) |