Working Paper: NBER ID: w12920
Authors: Andrea Mattozzi; Antonio Merlo
Abstract: In this paper, we study the initial recruitment of individuals in the political sector. We propose an equilibrium model of political recruitment by a party who faces competition for political talent from the lobbying sector. We show that a political party may deliberately choose to recruit only mediocre politicians, in spite of the fact that it could afford to recruit better individuals who would like to become politicians. We argue that this finding may contribute to explain the observation that in many countries the political class is mostly composed of mediocre people.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: D72; J44; J45
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Political parties (D72) | Mediocre politicians (D73) |
| Wages in lobbying sector (J31) | Political recruitment decisions (D79) |
| Political recruitment decisions (D79) | Quality of politicians (D73) |
| Productivity of political skills in lobbying sector (D72) | Likelihood of recruiting best politicians (D72) |
| Political recruitment decisions (D79) | Total rents (R33) |