Working Paper: NBER ID: w12851
Authors: Efraim Benmelech; Tobias J. Moskowitz
Abstract: We investigate the causes and consequences of financial regulation by studying the political economy of U.S. state usury laws in the 19th century. We find evidence that usury laws were binding and enforced and that lending activity was affected by rate ceilings. Exploiting the heterogeneity across states and time in regulation, enforcement, and market conditions, we find that regulation tightens when it is less costly and when it coexists with other economic and political restrictions that exclude certain groups. Furthermore, the same determinants of financial regulation that favor one group (and restrict others) are associated with higher (lower) future economic growth rates. The evidence suggests regulation is the outcome of private interests using the coercive power of the state to extract rents from other groups, highlighting the endogeneity of financial development and growth.
Keywords: Financial Regulation; Usury Laws; Political Economy; Economic Growth
JEL Codes: G2; G38; N2; O16
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| usury laws (K35) | lending activity (G21) |
| binding usury laws (K35) | penalties for usury (E49) |
| market interest rates rise (E43) | states relax restrictions (H70) |
| tighter usury laws (G21) | credit rationing (G21) |
| incumbent political power (P16) | usury laws (K35) |
| stringency of usury laws (G21) | future economic growth rates (O49) |