Working Paper: NBER ID: w12785
Authors: Axel Ockenfels; David Reiley; Abdolkarim Sadrieh
Abstract: The economic literature on online auctions is rapidly growing because of the enormous amount of freely available field data. Moreover, numerous innovations in auction-design features on platforms such as eBay have created excellent research opportunities. In this article, we survey the theoretical, empirical, and experimental research on bidder strategies (including the timing of bids and winner's-curse effects) and seller strategies (including reserve-price policies and the use of buy-now options) in online auctions, as well as some of the literature dealing with online-auction design (including stopping rules and multi-object pricing rules).
Keywords: Online auctions; Bidder strategies; Auction design
JEL Codes: D44
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| introduction of electronic information systems (L86) | auction participation (D44) |
| auction participation (D44) | price discovery (D47) |
| increased competition among bidders (D44) | willingness to pay (D11) |
| use of reserve prices (D44) | bidder behavior (D44) |
| timing of bids (D44) | higher final prices (G13) |