Working Paper: NBER ID: w12778
Authors: Georgemarios Angeletos; Alessandro Pavan
Abstract: In recent years there has been a growing interest in macro models with heterogeneity in information and complementarity in actions. These models deliver promising positive properties, such as heightened inertia and volatility. But they also raise important normative questions, such as whether the heightened inertia and volatility are socially undesirable, whether there is room for policies that correct the way agents use information in equilibrium, and what are the welfare effects of the information disseminated by the media or policy makers. We argue that a key to answering all these questions is the relation between the equilibrium and the socially optimal degrees of coordination. The former summarizes the private value from aligning individual decisions, whereas the latter summarizes the value that society assigns to such an alignment once all externalities are internalized.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: C72; D62; D82; E3; E5
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| degree of complementarity perceived by agents (L15) | welfare (I38) |
| policies designed to manipulate agents' incentives (D82) | efficient allocation as an equilibrium (D51) |
| equilibrium degree of coordination is inefficiently high (D59) | welfare (I38) |
| relationship between the equilibrium and socially optimal coordination (D51) | aggregate activity responds to fundamentals and noise (E19) |
| equilibrium use of information is inefficient (D89) | justification for policy interventions (D78) |