Working Paper: NBER ID: w12769
Authors: Michele Boldrin; David K. Levine
Abstract: Intellectual property (IP) protection involves a trade-off between the undesirability of monopoly and the desirable encouragement of creation and innovation. Optimal policy depends on the quantitative strength of these two forces. We give a quantitative assessment of current IP policies. We focus particularly on the scale of the market, showing that as it increases, due either to growth or to the expansion of trade, IP protection should be reduced.
Keywords: Intellectual Property; Market Size; Innovation; Optimal Policy
JEL Codes: A0; A1; A10; D0; D00; D02
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Market Size (L25) | Optimal Length of IP Protection (O34) |
| Market Size (L25) | Elasticity of Total Monopoly Revenue (D42) |
| Optimal Length of IP Protection (O34) | Market Size (L25) |
| Innovations (O35) | Market Size (L25) |
| Market Size (L25) | Demand Elasticity for Innovative Goods (O39) |