Working Paper: NBER ID: w12507
Authors: Michael S. Visser; William T. Harbaugh; Naci H. Mocan
Abstract: We report results from economic experiments that provide a direct test of the hypothesis that criminal behavior responds rationally to changes in the possible rewards and in the probability and severity of punishment. The experiments involve decisions that are best described as petty larceny, and are done using high school and college students who can anonymously take real money from each other. We find that decisions about whether and how much to steal are, in general, rational and responsive to the variations in tradeoffs, and sometimes, though not always, to the overall availability of criminal opportunities.
Keywords: criminal behavior; deterrence; juveniles; young adults; economic experiments
JEL Codes: D64; K42; L11
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| increased probability of detection (Y50) | decreased amount of stolen loot (K42) |
| increased severity of fines (K42) | decreased amount of stolen loot (K42) |
| increased availability of criminal opportunities (K42) | increased amount of stolen loot (K42) |
| deterrence measures (K42) | rational decision-making in criminal behavior (D01) |
| exogenous variations in relative prices (F11) | responsiveness in participation in crime (K42) |
| exogenous variations in relative prices (F11) | responsiveness in amount of loot stolen (P26) |