Working Paper: NBER ID: w12478
Authors: Janet Currie; W. Bentley Macleod
Abstract: We examine the impact of tort reforms using U.S. birth records for 1989-2001. We make four contributions: First, we develop a model that analyzes the incentives created by specific tort reforms. Second, we assemble new data on tort reform. Third, we examine a range of outcomes. Finally, we allow for differential effects by demographic/risk group. We find that reforms of the "deep pockets rule" reduce complications of labor and C-sections, while caps on noneconomic damages increase them. Our results demonstrate there are important interactions between incentives created by tort law and other incentives facing physicians.
Keywords: tort reform; birth outcomes; medical malpractice; cesarean sections; physician incentives
JEL Codes: I12; I18; K13
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| deep pockets rule (joint and several liability reform) (K13) | reduction in the incidence of cesarean sections (J13) |
| deep pockets rule (joint and several liability reform) (K13) | reduction in complications during labor and delivery (J89) |
| caps on noneconomic damages (K13) | increase in the incidence of cesarean sections (J13) |
| caps on noneconomic damages (K13) | increase in complications during labor and delivery (J89) |
| marginal procedures induced/encouraged by tort reform (K13) | little impact on infant health (I19) |