Working Paper: NBER ID: w12174
Authors: Roland G. Fryer Jr.
Abstract: The literature on statistical discrimination shows that ex-ante identical groups may be differentially treated in discriminatory equilibria. This paper constructs a dynamic model of statistical discrimination and explores what happens to the individuals who nonetheless overcome the initial discrimination. If an employer discriminates against a group of workers in her initial hiring, she may actually favor the successful members of that group when she promotes from within the firm. The worker's welfare implications (i.e. who benefits from an employer's discriminatory hiring practices) are unclear. Even though agents face discrimination initially, some may be better off because of it.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: J7
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Initial discriminatory hiring practices (J79) | Promotion of successful individuals from the discriminated group (J62) |
| Successful performance of individuals (D29) | Promotion of successful individuals from the discriminated group (J62) |
| Initial discriminatory hiring practices (J79) | Successful performance of individuals (D29) |