Working Paper: NBER ID: w12125
Authors: Francesco Caselli; Wilbur John Coleman II
Abstract: We present a theory of ethnic conflict in which coalitions formed along ethnic lines compete for the economy's resources. The role of ethnicity is to enforce coalition membership: in ethnically homogeneous societies members of the losing coalition can defect to the winners at low cost, and this rules out conflict as an equilibrium outcome. We derive a number of implications of the model relating social, political, and economic indicators such as the incidence of conflict, the distance among ethnic groups, group sizes, income inequality, and expropriable resources.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: P48; Q34; Z13
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Ethnic diversity (J15) | dynamics of conflict (D74) |
| Formation of coalitions along ethnic lines (D72) | increased competition for resources (Q34) |
| Increased competition for resources (Q34) | increased likelihood of conflict (D74) |
| Presence of expropriable resources (H13) | intensity of conflict (D74) |
| Size of ethnic groups (J15) | conflict outcomes (D74) |
| Relative distances of ethnic groups (J15) | conflict outcomes (D74) |
| Changes in resource distribution and ethnic composition (R23) | dynamics of conflict (D74) |