Working Paper: NBER ID: w11531
Authors: Alberto Alesina; Guido Tabellini
Abstract: Opportunistic politicians maximize the probability of reelection and rents from office holding. Can it be optimal from their point of view to delegate policy choices to independent bureaucracies? The answer is yes: politicians will delegate some policy tasks, though in general not those that would be socially optimal to delegate. In particular, politicians tend not to delegate coalition forming redistributive policies and policies that create large rents or effective campaign contributions. Instead they prefer to delegate risky policies to shift risk (and blame) on bureaucracies.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: No JEL codes provided
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| risky tasks (D91) | delegation of tasks (M54) |
| redistributive tasks (H23) | non-delegation of tasks (Y70) |
| potential for campaign contributions (D72) | delegation of tasks (M54) |
| perceived risks involved in policy outcomes (D81) | delegation of tasks (M54) |
| type of task delegated (M54) | electoral outcomes (K16) |