Working Paper: NBER ID: w11505
Authors: Jean Helwege; Christo Pirinsky; Ren M. Stulz
Abstract: We consider IPO firms from 1970 to 2001 and examine the evolution of their insider ownership over time to understand better why and how U.S. firms that become widely held do so. In our sample, a majority of firms has insider ownership below 20% after ten years. We find that a firm's stock market performance and trading play an extremely important role in its insider ownership dynamics. Firms that experience large decreases in insider ownership and/or become widely held are firms with high valuations, good recent stock market performance, and liquid markets for their stocks. In contrast and surprisingly, variables suggested by agency theory have limited success in explaining the evolution of insider ownership.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: G30; G32; D0
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Good stock market performance (G17) | Significant decreases in insider ownership (G34) |
| High valuations (G19) | Significant decreases in insider ownership (G34) |
| Good stock market performance (G17) | Higher turnover (J63) |
| Higher turnover (J63) | Significant decreases in insider ownership (G34) |
| Good recent stock performance (G17) | Likelihood of becoming widely held increases (G40) |
| Moral hazard and information asymmetry variables (D82) | Changes in insider ownership (G34) |