Working Paper: NBER ID: w11491
Authors: David S. Lee; Justin McCrary
Abstract: Economic theory predicts that increasing the severity of punishments will deter criminal behavior by raising the expected price of committing crime. This implicit price can be substantially raised by making prison sentences longer, but only if offenders' discount rates are relatively low. We use a large sample of felony arrests to measure the deterrence effect of criminal sanctions. We exploit the fact that young offenders are legally treated as adults--and face longer lengths of incarceration--the day they turn 18. Sufficiently patient individuals should therefore significantly lower their offending rates immediately upon turning 18. The small behavioral responses that we estimate suggest that potential offenders are extremely impatient, myopic, or both.
Keywords: crime; punishment; deterrence; juvenile justice
JEL Codes: D9; K4
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| increased severity of sanctions (Z28) | offending rates (K42) |
| age 18 (J13) | increased severity of sanctions (Z28) |
| increased severity of sanctions (Z28) | odds of arrest (K42) |
| age 18 (J13) | odds of arrest (K42) |