Working Paper: NBER ID: w11462
Authors: Stephen Coate; Brian Knight
Abstract: This paper provides a welfare economic analysis of the problem of districting. In the context of a simple micro-founded model intended to capture the salient features of U.S. politics, it studies how a social planner should allocate citizens of different ideologies across districts to maximize aggregate utility. In the model, districting determines the equilibrium seat-vote curve which is the relationship between the aggregate vote share of the political parties and their share of seats in the legislature. To understand optimal districting, the paper first characterizes the optimal seat-vote curve which describes the ideal relationship between votes and seats. It then shows that under rather weak conditions the optimal seat-vote curve is implementable in the sense that there exist districtings which make the equilibrium seat-vote curve equal to the optimal seat-vote curve. The nature of these optimal districtings is described. Finally, the paper provides a full characterization of the constrained optimal seat-vote curve and the districtings that underlie it when the optimal seat-vote curve is not achievable.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: D7
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| allocation of voters across districts (D72) | equilibrium seat-vote curve (D72) |
| equilibrium seat-vote curve (D72) | optimal seat-vote curve (D72) |
| districting practices (R23) | aggregate utility (E10) |
| voter composition (K16) | legislative representation (D72) |
| fraction of independents relative to partisans (D79) | feasibility of achieving optimal districting (D72) |