Working Paper: NBER ID: w11460
Authors: Thomas Hellmann
Abstract: This paper examines an ex-post rationale for the patenting of scientific discoveries. In this model,\nscientist do not know which firms can make use of their discoveries, and firms do not know which\nscientific discoveries might be useful to them. To bridge this gap, either or both sides need to engage\nin costly search activities. Patents determine the appropriability of scientific discoveries, which\naffects the scientists. and firms. willingness to engage in search. Patents decrease dissemination\nwhen the search intensity of firms is sufficiently elastic, relative to that of scientists. The model also\nexamines the role of universities. Patents facilitate the delegation of search activities to the\nuniversities' technology transfer offices, which enables efficient specialization. Rather than\ndistracting scientists from doing research, patenting may be a complement to doing research.
Keywords: patents; scientific discoveries; technology transfer; commercialization
JEL Codes: O33; O34; M13
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| patent protection (O34) | search incentives for scientists (O36) |
| search incentives for scientists (O36) | expected time to find a match with firms (C78) |
| patent protection (O34) | scientists' search intensity (C91) |
| patent protection (O34) | firms' search efforts (L20) |
| scientists' search intensity (inelastic) (Q31) | likelihood of scientific discovery being developed (O36) |
| TTO involvement (O30) | efficiency of search activities (G14) |
| complete contracts (D86) | TTO involvement (O30) |