Working Paper: NBER ID: w11375
Authors: Alessandra Casella; Andrew Gelman
Abstract: This paper proposes a simple scheme designed to elicit and reward intensity of preferences in referenda: voters faced with a number of binary proposals are given one regular vote for each proposal plus an additional number of bonus votes to cast as desired. Decisions are taken according to the majority of votes cast. In our base case, where there is no systematic difference between proposals' supporters and opponents, there is always a positive number of bonus votes such that ex ante utility is increased by the scheme, relative to simple majority voting. When the distributions of valuations of supporters and opponents differ, the improvement in efficiency is guaranteed only if the distributions can be ranked according to first order stochastic dominance. If they are, however, the existence of welfare gains is independent of the exact number of bonus votes.
Keywords: Voting mechanism; Referenda; Bonus votes; Welfare gains; Direct democracy
JEL Codes: D7; H1; K19
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| bonus votes (D72) | improve welfare (I30) |
| bonus votes (D72) | increase ex ante utility (D11) |
| distributions of valuations can be ranked according to first-order stochastic dominance (C46) | improvement in efficiency (D61) |
| bonus votes (D72) | more efficient outcome (D61) |
| bonus votes (D72) | enhance overall welfare (I30) |
| welfare gains are independent of the exact number of bonus votes (D72) | improved welfare outcomes (I38) |
| bonus votes (D72) | significant benefits in terms of efficiency and welfare (D61) |