Working Paper: NBER ID: w11317
Authors: Matias Iaryczower; Pablo T. Spiller; Mariano Tommasi
Abstract: This paper links the theory of interest groups influence over the legislature with that of congressional control over the judiciary. The resulting framework reconciles the theoretical literature of lobbying with the negative available evidence on the impact of lobbying over legislative outcomes, and sheds light to the determinants of lobbying in separation-of-powers systems. We provide conditions for judicial decisions to be sensitive to legislative lobbying, and find that lobbying falls the more divided the legislature is on the relevant issues. We apply this framework to analyze supreme court labor decisions in Argentina, and find results consistent with the predictions of the theory.
Keywords: Judicial Lobbying; Labor Law; Constitutional Interpretation
JEL Codes: K4; O1
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| lobbying (D72) | judicial decisions (K41) |
| legislative division (H11) | lobbying effectiveness (D72) |
| strikes organized by unions (J52) | pro-labor rulings (J58) |
| legislators' responsiveness to public opinion (D72) | stability of judicial rulings (K41) |
| judicial constraints by legislature (K10) | pro-labor rulings (J58) |