Working Paper: NBER ID: w11273
Authors: Lee J. Alston; Bernardo Mueller
Abstract: The Brazilian Constitution of 1988 gave relatively strong powers to the President. We model and test Executive-Legislative relations in Brazil and demonstrate that Presidents have used pork as a political currency to exchange for votes on policy reforms. In particular Presidents Cardoso and Lula have used pork to exchange for amendments to the Constitution. Without policy reforms Brazil would have had greater difficulty meeting their debt obligations. The logic for the exchange of pork for policy reform is that Presidents typically have greater electoral incentives than members of Congress to care about economic growth, economic opportunity, income equality and price stabilization. Members of Congress generally care more about redistributing gains to their constituents. Given the differences in preferences and the relative powers of each, the Legislative and Executive benefit by exploiting the gains from trade.
Keywords: executive-legislative relations; Brazil; political institutions; pork barrel politics; policy reform
JEL Codes: D73; D72; D23
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| president's agenda power (D72) | favorable policy outcomes (D78) |
| president's agenda power (D72) | legislative successes (K16) |
| strategic distribution of patronage (D39) | legislative successes (K16) |
| president's electoral incentives (D72) | alignment with national economic goals (F52) |
| individual congress members' interests (D72) | focus on local interests (F52) |
| Brazilian Congress (H69) | policy stability through president's leadership of a coalition (E61) |
| pork as political currency (D72) | secure legislative support for policy reforms (D72) |