Working Paper: NBER ID: w11265
Authors: Nicola Gennaioli; Andrei Shleifer
Abstract: We evaluate Richard Posner's famous hypothesis that common law converges to efficient legal rules using a model of precedent setting by appellate judges. Following legal realists, we assume that judicial decisions are subject to personal biases, and that changing precedent is costly to judges. We consider separately the evolution of precedent under judicial overruling of previous decisions, as well as under distinguishing cases based on new material dimensions. Convergence to efficient legal rules occurs only under very special circumstances, but the evolution of precedent over time is on average beneficial under more plausible conditions.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: K13; K4
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| judicial biases (K41) | legal outcomes (K40) |
| type of judge (efficiency-oriented vs. biased) (K41) | legal outcomes (K40) |
| judicial biases (K41) | efficiency of legal rules (K40) |
| evolution of legal rules (K40) | efficiency of legal rules (K40) |
| judicial biases (K41) | evolution of legal rules (K40) |