Working Paper: NBER ID: w11235
Authors: Daron Acemoglu
Abstract: In this essay I review the new book by Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, The Economic Effects of Constitutions, which investigates the policy and economic consequences of different forms of government and electoral rules. I also take advantage of this opportunity to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of a number of popular empirical strategies in the newly emerging field of comparative political economy.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: P16; O10
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| parliamentary systems (D72) | more persistent fiscal outcomes (E62) |
| proportional representation (C35) | greater expansions in welfare spending near elections (H53) |
| presidential and majoritarian systems (D72) | smaller governments (H10) |