Working Paper: NBER ID: w11171
Authors: Torsten Persson
Abstract: The paper combines insights from the recent research programs on constitutions and economic policy, and on history, institutions and growth. Drawing on cross-sectional as well as panel data, it presents new empirical results showing that the form of democracy (rather than democracy vs. non-democracy) has important consequences for the adoption of structural polices that promote long-run economic performance. Reforms into parliamentary (as opposed to presidential), proportional (as opposed to majoritarian) and permanent (as opposed to temporary) democracy appear to produce the most growth-promoting policies.
Keywords: democracy; economic development; structural policy
JEL Codes: F43; H11; O57
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Age of democracy (D72) | Structural policy effectiveness (F68) |
| Majoritarian systems (D72) | Trade liberalization (F13) |
| Temporary democratic reforms (P39) | Structural policy (H19) |
| Permanent democratic reforms (D72) | Structural policy (H19) |
| Parliamentary democracy (D72) | Economic performance (P17) |
| Proportional electoral systems (D72) | Trade liberalization (F13) |