Working Paper: NBER ID: w11168
Authors: Josh Lerner; Feng Zhu
Abstract: Economists have debated the extent to which strengthening patent protection spurs or detracts from technological innovation. In this paper, we examine the reduction of software copyright protection in the Lotus v. Borland decision. If patent and copyright protections are substitutes, then weakening of one form of protection should be associated with an increasing reliance on the other. We find that the firms affected by the diminution of copyright protection disproportionately accelerated their patenting in subsequent years. But little evidence can be found for harmful effects: in fact, the increased reliance on patents is correlated with some positive outcomes for firms.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: O3
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
Cause | Effect |
---|---|
Reduction of software copyright protection in the Lotus v. Borland decision (L17) | Increased reliance on patenting among interface firms (O36) |
Increased reliance on patenting among interface firms (O36) | Growth in sales and other performance measures (L25) |
Reduction of software copyright protection in the Lotus v. Borland decision (L17) | Growth in sales and other performance measures (L25) |
Increased reliance on patenting among interface firms (O36) | Positive outcomes such as growth in sales (L25) |