Working Paper: NBER ID: w11156
Authors: Benjamin Chiao; Josh Lerner; Jean Tirole
Abstract: This paper empirically explores the procedures employed by standard-setting organizations. Consistent with Lerner-Tirole (2004), we find (a) a negative relationship between the extent to which an SSO is oriented to technology sponsors and the concession level required of sponsors and (b) a positive correlation between the sponsor-friendliness of the selected SSO and the quality of the standard. We also develop and test two extensions of the earlier model: the presence of provisions mandating royalty-free licensing is negatively associated with disclosure requirements, and when there are only a limited number of SSOs, the relationship between concessions and user friendliness is weaker.
Keywords: Standard Setting Organizations; Intellectual Property; Disclosure Requirements; Licensing
JEL Codes: L2; O3
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Sponsor-friendliness of the SSO (Z23) | Concessions required of sponsors (Z23) |
| Maturity of technological field (O30) | Sponsor-friendliness of the selected SSO (Z23) |
| Royalty-free licensing provisions (D45) | Disclosure requirements (G38) |
| Limited number of competitors (L13) | Relationship between user-friendliness and concessions (D16) |