Working Paper: NBER ID: w10795
Authors: Orley Ashenfelter; Kathryn Graddy
Abstract: The Sotheby's/Christie's price-fixing scandal that ended in the public trial of Alfred Taubman provides a unique window on a number of key economic and antitrust policy issues related to the use of the auction system. The trial provided detailed evidence as to how the price fixing worked, and the economic conditions under which it was started and began to fall apart. The outcome of the case also provides evidence on the novel auction process used to choose the lead counsel for the civil settlement. Finally, though buyers received the bulk of the damages, a straightforward application of the economic theory of auctions shows that it is unlikely that successful buyers as a group were injured.
Keywords: Auction; Price-Fixing; Antitrust Policy
JEL Codes: D44; K21; L41
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| economic conditions (downturn) (E66) | price-fixing agreement (L42) |
| economic conditions (upturn) (E66) | breakdown of conspiracy (D74) |
| Justice Department's amnesty policy (K37) | uncovering of collusion (K21) |
| auction process (D44) | distribution of damages (D30) |