Working Paper: NBER ID: w10710
Authors: Michael L. Katz; Howard A. Shelanski
Abstract: Merger policy is the most active area of U.S. antitrust policy. It is now widely believed that merger policy must move beyond its traditional focus on static efficiency to account for innovation and address dynamic efficiency. Innovation can fundamentally affect merger analysis in two ways. First, innovation can dramatically affect the relationship between the pre-merger marketplace and what is likely to happen if a proposed merger is consummated. Thus, innovation can fundamentally influence the appropriate analysis for addressing traditional, static efficiency concerns. Second, innovation can itself be an important dimension of market performance that is potentially affected by a merger. We explore how merger policy is meeting the challenges posed by innovation.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: L4
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| innovation (O35) | market structure (D49) |
| mergers (G34) | innovation incentives (O31) |
| market structure (D49) | innovation incentives (O31) |
| mergers (G34) | market competition (L13) |
| innovation (O35) | competitive outcomes (L13) |