Working Paper: NBER ID: w10609
Authors: John A. List; Daniel M. Sturm
Abstract: In this paper we explore to what extent secondary policy issues are influenced by electoral incentives. We develop a political agency model in which a politician decides on both a frontline policy issue, such as the level of public spending, and a secondary policy issue, such as environmental policy. The model shows under which conditions the incumbent finds it worthwhile to manipulate the secondary policy to attract additional votes to his platform. We test the predictions of the model using state-level panel data on Gubernatorial environmental policy choices over the years 1960-2000. In contrast to the popular view that choices on secondary policy instruments are largely determined by lobbying, we find strong effects of electoral incentives on environmental policy.
Keywords: Elections; Environmental Policy; Political Agency; Term Limits; Voter Preferences
JEL Codes: D72; H72; Q58
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Electoral incentives (D72) | Environmental policy decisions (Q58) |
| Incumbents can be reelected (D72) | Environmental policies reflect the interests of single-issue voters (Q58) |
| Binding term limit (Y20) | Less environmentally friendly policies (Q58) |
| Substantial green constituencies (Q01) | Less environmentally friendly policies under binding term limit (F64) |
| Smaller environmental groups (Q59) | Greener policies once term-limited (Q58) |
| Political competition (D72) | Degree of manipulation of environmental policies (Q58) |