Working Paper: NBER ID: w10463
Authors: Li Gan; Roberton C. Williams III; Thomas Wiseman
Abstract: We present a simple model of the effects of hate crime legislation. It shows that even if the direct harm to victims of hate crime is the same as for other crimes, because of other differences in the effects it may still be optimal to exert more law-enforcement effort to deter or prevent hate crime. These differences also have previously unrecognized effects on the optimal level of effort by potential hate crime victims to avoid being victimized, thus affecting the efficiency of government policies that encourage or discourage such effort. We discuss the implications of these results for optimal hate-crime policy, as well as for policy toward other similar crimes, such as terrorism.
Keywords: hate crime; legislation; optimal punishment; law enforcement; public policy
JEL Codes: K14; K42; J71
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Lower weight on criminal utility (K14) | Higher optimal punishment for hate crimes (K42) |
| Negative externalities from hate crimes (K42) | Higher optimal punishment effort for hate crimes (K42) |
| Avoidance efforts by potential victims (K42) | Higher optimal punishment level for hate crimes (K42) |
| Avoidance efforts by potential victims (K42) | Lower optimal punishment level for hate crimes (K14) |
| Higher marginal cost of avoidance effort for hate crimes (K42) | Lower optimal punishment (K49) |
| Fewer potential hate crime victims (J15) | Higher optimal punishment (K49) |
| Fewer potential hate crime victims (J15) | Lower optimal punishment (K49) |