Working Paper: NBER ID: w10455
Authors: Murat Iyigun; Dani Rodrik
Abstract: We analyze the interplay of policy reform and entrepreneurship in a model where investment decisions and policy outcomes are both subject to uncertainty. The production costs of non-traditional activities are unknown and can only be discovered by entrepreneurs who make sunk investments. The policy maker has access to two strategies: policy tinkering,' which corresponds to a new draw from a pre-existing policy regime, and institutional reform,' which corresponds to a draw from a different regime and imposes an adjustment cost on incumbent firms. Tinkering and institutional reform both have their respective advantages. Institutional reforms work best in settings where entrepreneurial activity is weak, while it is likely to produce disappointing outcomes where the cost discovery process is vibrant. We present cross-country evidence that strongly supports such a conditional relationship.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: O1; O4
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Institutional reforms (O17) | Entrepreneurship (M13) |
| Entrepreneurship (M13) | Success of institutional reforms (O17) |
| Cost discovery (D47) | Success of institutional reforms (O17) |
| Policy tinkering (D72) | Economic activity (E29) |
| Institutional reforms (O17) | Economic activity (E29) |
| Existing policies are undesirable (J18) | Policy tinkering dominates (D72) |
| Modern sector is unproductive (P23) | Policy tinkering dominates (D72) |
| Modern sector is moderately productive (P23) | Institutional reform preferable (O17) |