Working Paper: NBER ID: w10439
Authors: James E. Anderson; Maurizio Zanardi
Abstract: Much economic policy is deliberately shifted away from direct political processes to administrative processes --- political pressure deflection. Pressure deflection poses a puzzle to standard political economy models which suggest that having policies to `sell' is valuable to politicians. The puzzle is solved here by showing that incumbents will favor pressure deflection since it can deter viability of a challenger, essentially like entry deterrence. U.S. trade policy since 1934 provides a prime example, especially antidumping law and its evolution.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: D72; F13
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| political pressure deflection (D72) | viability of political challengers (D72) |
| U.S. trade policy (antidumping laws) (F18) | political pressure deflection (D72) |