Working Paper: NBER ID: w10234
Authors: Casey B. Mulligan; Andrei Shleifer
Abstract: We present a model of efficient regulation along the lines of Demsetz (1967). In this model, setting up and running regulatory institutions takes a fixed cost, and therefore jurisdictions with larger populations affected by a given regulation are more likely to have them. Consistent with the model, we find that higher population U.S. states have more pages of legislation and adopt particular laws earlier in their history. We also find that specific types of regulation, including the regulation of entry, the regulation of labor, and the military draft are more extensive in countries with larger populations. Overall, the data show that population is an empirically important determinant of regulation.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: H11; K10
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Population (J11) | Regulation (L51) |
| Higher Population States (R23) | More Legislation (K29) |
| Population (J11) | Specific Types of Regulation (L51) |
| Population Size (J11) | Regulatory Breadth (K20) |
| Population (J11) | Nature of Regulation (L51) |
| Population Size (J11) | Timeline of Regulatory Adoption (G18) |