Working Paper: NBER ID: w10180
Authors: Herschel I. Grossman
Abstract: Although most disputes between groups of people are settled peacefully, sometimes disputes result in war. This lecture uses historical examples to illustrate how the ability to negotiate a credible peaceful settlement of a dispute between sovereign states, typically a dispute over the control of territory or natural resources, depends on the divisibility of the outcome of the dispute, on the effectiveness of the fortifications and counterattacks with which an attacker would expect to have to contend, and on the permanence of the outcome of a potential war. The lecture also contrasts the possibilities for avoiding wars between sovereign states with the possibilities for avoiding civil wars.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: D74; H56
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| divisibility of outcome (C69) | likelihood of peaceful settlement (D74) |
| value of contested territory (D46) | credibility of promises not to start a war (D74) |
| effectiveness of fortifications (H56) | credibility of promises not to start a war (D74) |
| perceived risk of war (H56) | likelihood to initiate conflict (D74) |
| overoptimism about military success (H56) | miscalculations that result in war (D74) |
| underestimating opponent's capabilities (D80) | conflict (D74) |
| strength of defenses (H56) | credibility of promises not to start a war (D74) |