Working Paper: NBER ID: w10102
Authors: Giovanni Maggi; Massimo Morelli
Abstract: Some international organizations are governed by unanimity rule, some others by a majority system. Still others have moved from one system to the other over time. The existing voting models, which generally assume that decisions made by voting are perfectly enforceable, have a difficult time explaining the observed variation in governance mode, and in particular the widespread occurrence of the unanimity system. We present a model whose main departure from standard voting models is that there is no external enforcement mechanism: each country is sovereign and cannot be forced to follow the collective decision, or in other words, the voting system must be self-enforcing. The model yields unanimity as the optimal system for a wide range of parameters, and delivers rich predictions on the variation in the mode of governance, both across organizations and over time.
Keywords: voting systems; international organizations; self-enforcement; governance modes
JEL Codes: D70; F02; H77
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| discount factor (H43) | voting rule (D72) |
| preference correlation (C10) | voting rule (D72) |
| transfers (F16) | voting sustainability (K16) |
| governance mode (H11) | organization size (L25) |