Working Paper: NBER ID: w10101
Authors: Andres Almazan; Javier Suarez; Sheridan Titman
Abstract: Firms that are more highly levered are forced to raise capital more often, a process that generates information about them. Of course transparency can improve the allocation of capital. However, when the information about the firm affects the terms under which the firm transacts with its customers and employees, transparency can have an offsetting negative effect. Under relatively general conditions, good news improves these terms of trade less than bad news worsens them, implying that increased transparency can lower firm value. In addition, we show that transparency can reduce the incentives of firms and stakeholders to undertake relationship specific investments. The negative effects of transparency can lead firms to pass up positive NPV investments that require external funding and to choose more conservative capital structures that they would otherwise choose. These effects should be especially important for technology firms that require a reputation for being on the leading edge.'
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: G3
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Higher leverage (G19) | Increased external scrutiny (O36) |
| Increased external scrutiny (O36) | Potential revelation of bad news (D84) |
| Potential revelation of bad news (D84) | Decreased firm value (G32) |
| Transparency (G38) | Increased scrutiny (G18) |
| Increased scrutiny (G18) | Reduced investment incentives (G31) |
| Reduced investment incentives (G31) | Lower firm value (G32) |