Working Paper: NBER ID: w10040
Authors: Casey B. Mulligan; Ricard Gil; Xavier Sala-i-Martin
Abstract: Estimates of democracy's effect on the public sector are obtained from comparisons of 142 countries over the years 1960-90. Based on three tenets of voting theory -- that voting mutes policy preference intensity, political power is equally distributed in democracies, and the form of voting processes is important -- we expect democracy to affect policies that redistribute, or economically favor the political leadership, or enhance efficiency. We do not find such differences. Instead democracies are less likely to use policies that limit competition for public office. Alternative modeling approaches emphasize the degree of competition, and deemphasize the form or even existence of voting processes.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: H11; H61; D72
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| democracy (D72) | public policy (J18) |
| form of governance (H11) | public policies (J18) |
| democracies (D72) | policies limiting competition for public office (L44) |
| democracy (D72) | government revenue (H27) |
| democracy (D72) | redistribution (H23) |
| democracy (D72) | flatter personal income taxes (H24) |