Working Paper: NBER ID: w10004
Authors: Eli Berman
Abstract: Can rational choice modeling explain destructive behavior among the Taliban, Hama and other radical religious militias? This paper proposes a club good framework which emphasizes the function of voluntary religious organizations as efficient providers of local public goods in the absence of government provision. The sacrifices which these groups demand are economically efficient (as in Iannaccone (1992)) and make them well suited for solving the extreme principal-agent problems present in militia production. Thus the analysis can explain why religious radicals create such effective militias. Seemingly gratuitous acts of violence by group members destroy their outside options, increasing the incentive compatibility of loyalty. The analysis has clear implications for economic policy to contain militias.
Keywords: Radical Religious Militias; Rational Choice; Public Goods; Militia Activity; Economic Policy
JEL Codes: D2; H41; J0; M5; N4; O17; Z13
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| radical religious groups like the Taliban and Hamas effectively create militias (O17) | provide local public goods in environments where government provision is absent (H41) |
| economic efficiency of sacrifices demanded from members (D61) | signal commitment to the group and enhance loyalty (D70) |
| acts of violence (K42) | destroy outside options for members (D71) |
| destroy outside options for members (D71) | enhance loyalty and commitment to the group (C92) |
| increased government provision of public goods (H49) | weaken the influence of these militias (H56) |