Working Paper: NBER ID: w0420
Authors: A. Mitchell Polinsky
Abstract: This paper formally analyzes strict liability and negligence in a market setting. The discussion emphasizes the impact of the rules on the market price and on the number of firms in the industry. For simplicity, the damage caused by each firm is assumed to be determined only by that firm's "care" (and not also by the firm's output or the victim's behavior).
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: No JEL codes provided
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Strict Liability (K13) | Short-Run Efficiency (D61) |
| Negligence (K13) | Short-Run Efficiency (D61) |
| Strict Liability (K13) | Long-Run Efficiency (D61) |
| Negligence (K13) | Long-Run Efficiency (D61) |
| Optimal Negligence Standard (K13) | Long-Run Efficiency (D61) |
| Optimal Negligence Standard (K13) | Short-Run Efficiency (D61) |