Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP992
Authors: Yannis Katsoulacos; David Ulph
Abstract: We evaluate the social welfare loss (WL) that arises in an oligopolistic industry under technological competition and product differentiation. The main novelty of our approach concerns the decomposition of the WL into `dynamic' losses (from too little cost reduction and an inappropriate number of research laboratories) and `static' losses (from suboptimal output levels and from `rent-seeking' behaviour). This allows us to explore the possibility of trade-offs between static and dynamic losses in the effect of competition policy (driving price towards marginal cost) and industrial policy (lengthening patent life). It also allows for an evaluation of the relative significance of these losses. We find that generally there is no trade-off with respect to industrial policy, but a trade-off emerges with respect to competition policy. The dominant components of WL are the dynamic loss from too little cost reduction and, especially, the `rent-seeking' losses. We also find that WL is increasing as regulation pushes price towards marginal cost and is decreasing as patent life increases.
Keywords: static efficiency; dynamic efficiency; nontournament model; technological competition; competition policy; industrial policy
JEL Codes: D43; D60; L13
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| total welfare loss (D69) | dynamic loss from too little cost reduction (D61) |
| total welfare loss (D69) | dynamic loss from the wrong number of R&D laboratories (O39) |
| total welfare loss (D69) | regulation driving prices towards marginal costs (D40) |
| total welfare loss (D69) | longer patent lives (O34) |
| competition policy (L49) | total welfare loss (D69) |
| industrial policy (O25) | total welfare loss (D69) |
| competition policy (L49) | dynamic losses (C69) |
| regulation (L51) | static efficiency (H21) |
| patent life (O34) | dynamic efficiency (C69) |