Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP9867
Authors: Luigi Zingales
Abstract: The very same forces that induce economists to conclude that regulators are captured should lead us to conclude that the economic profession is captured as well. As evidence of this capture, I show that papers whose conclusions are pro-management are more likely to be published in economic journals and more likely to be cited. I also show that business schools? faculty write papers that are more pro management. I highlight possible remedies to reduce the extent of this capture: from a reform of the publication process, to an enhanced data disclosure, from a stronger theoretical foundation to a mechanism of peer pressure. Ultimately, the most important remedy, however, is awareness, an awareness most economists still do not have.
Keywords: capture; economics profession; regulation
JEL Codes: D72; P16; Z13
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Economists (A11) | Capture by vested interests (P26) |
| Dependence on proprietary data (C80) | Bias in favor of business interests (D72) |
| Need to maintain good relationships with data providers (C81) | Bias in favor of business interests (D72) |
| Publication process in economics (A14) | Bias in favor of business interests (D72) |
| Editors favoring pro-business conclusions (K20) | Economists modifying their findings (E19) |
| Serving on corporate boards (G34) | Pro-management bias (M51) |
| Pro-business conclusions (K20) | More citations (Y50) |